Introduction
In 1911, Britain introduced the first publicly financed unemployment insurance (UI) system. Since then, UI programs of one sort or another have become key policy tools in virtually all industrial economies. The primary goal of these programs is to provide consumption smoothing over periods of employment and unemployment. 1 The drawback of UI programs stems from the moral hazard effect.
Indeed, the main line of research on the optimal design of UI benefits has focused on issues of the trade-off between consumption smoothing and moral hazard [see, for instance, Karni (1999) , for a broad survey].
The main insight provided by the early models that appeared in the late 70's [Baily (1978) , Flemming (1978) and Shavell and Weiss (1979) ] was the desirability of a declining schedule, that is, benefits should decline over the spell of unemployment so as to mitigate the moral hazard effect.
2 These early models have been extended in several directions. Two such examples are Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) who extended the set of fiscal instruments by allowing for a wage tax after reemployment; and Fredrikson and Holmlund (2001) , that consider a general equilibrium framework with endogenous wage determination (through bargaining between firms and workers). Notably, these models preserve the declining pattern featured by the early contributions.
3 1 UI programs also serve to enhance the efficiency of job search and matching in the labor market. 2 A declining time profile is fairly prevalent. Typically, UI benefits are offered for a limited duration and then replaced by lower benefits categorized as social or income assistance (the latter is often means tested to further mitigate the moral hazard issue). According to OECD (2004) UI duration in OECD countries ranges between 6 and 60 months (Belgium being an exception with an unlimited duration in some cases). 3 The literature emphasized the role of a declining UI schedule as a means to mitigate the tradeoff between consumption smoothing and moral hazard. Another strand in the literature demonstrates how a declining schedule can mitigate a different form of tradeoff between sorting (providing workers with incentives to wait for jobs that are more suitable) and unemployment [see Cremer, Merchand and Pestieu (1996) and, more recently, Blumkin, Hadar and Yashiv (2005) ].
A common assumption in the literature on optimal UI programs is the homogeneity of workers. Relaxing this assumption, that is assuming heterogeneous workers may have several important implications. First, with heterogeneous agents, there is no longer one Pareto-efficient UI program; but there will rather be many
Pareto-efficient UI programs. Second, a UI program need no longer consist of a single schedule, but may well consist of several time-dependent schedules which are incentive compatible. For instance, a UI program may offer one schedule with benefits rising over time and another one with benefits diminishing over time, and with individuals self-selecting between them.
Naturally, there may be many dimensions of heterogeneity one may consider.
Wage rates or job opportunities are clearly among them. However, individuals with the same wage rate (or job opportunities) may still have different personal attributes that affect their re-employment prospects. These attributes include, inert-alia, health, education, marital status and parenthood and social networking. Typically, many of these attributes are difficult and often very costly to observe. We refer to this broad class of attributes as search ability. 4 In this paper, we focus on this dimension of heterogeneity and study the time profile of UI benefits. Indeed, this kind of heterogeneity lends itself to the study of the time profile of UI benefits, because other dimensions of heterogeneity, such as wage heterogeneity, may be addressed by wagedependent UI or other means.
Allowing for individuals to differ in their search ability, we show that there may well exist Pareto-efficient programs that consist of schedules that offer rising benefits over time. In particular, we show that Pareto-efficient UI programs that favor individuals with low search ability offer the latter schedules with rising benefits over time, whereas individuals with high search ability are still offered schedules with declining benefits over time (as suggested by the literature).
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The organization of the paper will be as follows. In the following section we introduce the model. In section 3 we derive the properties of the optimal UI system.
We conclude in section 4.
The Model
We construct a simple bare-bone framework with just the key ingredients necessary to demonstrate our point. Consider a two-type economy where each individual (i=1,2) lives for two periods. We assume a continuum of individuals and normalize to unity the number of individuals for each type, with no loss in generality.
Job search is conducted in the beginning of each period. Each individual engages in search for a job which offers her (for each working period) a wage rate denoted by w>0. If the individual finds a job in the beginning of the first period of life, she works both in the first and in the second period. Otherwise she engages in a second round of search in the beginning of the second period, and provided that she finds a job, she works in the second period.
All individuals share the same instantaneous utility from consumption given by ) (c u , where 0 as ) (  '  and  as 
We assume that the probability of finding a job is a function of both the type of the individual (her ability), denoted by i a , and the search effort exerted, denoted 5 Shimer and Werning (2006) analyze the time-profile of UI benefits with heterogeneous workers. They focus on wage heterogeneity, whereas we choose to focus on differences in search abilities. Our papers also differ in some other aspects: first, we assume that the unemployed are credit-constrained; second, there are no lump-sum transfers in our setting; finally and most importantly, we allow for a menu of UI schedules. 6 Note that without being excessively unrealistic, in light of the empirical evidence [see the discussion in Saez (2002) ] suggesting that labor supply elasticity (conditional on participation) is fairly low, we simplify by focusing on the extensive margin (participation choice in the labor market) while ignoring the intensive margin (labor-leisure choice), by dropping leisure from the utility function. for all e), and hence will exert higher search efforts.
A standard assumption in the UI literature is that search effort is unobserved by the government. In our setup we further supplement this assumption by supposing, á la Mirrlees (1971) 
, the optimal choice of efforts in period 1 and 2, respectively, by type-i individuals. We henceforth omit the arguments of the consumption good is non-storable. 8 We turn next to the derivation of the Pareto-efficient UI programs. As there are two types of individuals, the government can possibly offer two schedules, each of which chosen by a different type of individual (a separating equilibrium). 9 We denote 8 The assumption that agents cannot accumulate assets implies that consumption during unemployment spells equals UI benefits. UI arrangement thus plays a dual role by providing both insurance and liquidity. Shavell and Weiss (1979) discuss the plausibility of the assumptions that the unemployed have no wealth and cannot borrow (the possibility of saving by the unemployed is far less likely even when UI benefits decline over time). The former assumption is made to simplify the analysis and can be relaxed by assuming a constant exogenous (type independent) source of income. The latter assumption seems plausible as the unemployed find it often difficult to borrow due to moral hazard issues (a primary reason for government provision of UI benefits). Shavell and Weiss (1979) do discuss the case where individuals can save, however, in the absence of moral hazard issues. Ruling out saving and borrowing is quite standard in the repeated moral hazard literature. A rare exception is Fudenberg, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990) ; see also the related discussion in Rogerson (1985) . For a recent paper that considers the optimal UI system while allowing workers to save and borrow freely, see Shimer and Werning (2006) . 9 In a recent paper, Luttmer and Zeckhauser (2008) the two benefit-tax schedules designed for the lowability individual (type 1) and high-ability individual (type 2), respectively. To be incentive-compatible, these schedules must satisfy the following self-selection constraints (which state that each type has no incentive to mimic the other type):
These schedules must satisfy also a revenue constraint, which by virtue of the law of large numbers, requires that expected net revenues are non-negative:
Note, that we assume just one overall budget constraint; that is, we do not require that the expected payments and benefits should be balanced at the individual level (as may be common in private but not in public programs, due to the re-distributive feature of the latter).
The set of Pareto-efficient UI programs consists of the set of pairs of 3-tuples, , which maximize a weighted average of the two utilities:
subject to the self-selection constraints in (2) and the revenues constraint in (3), where
is the social welfare weight assigned to type-2 individuals.
suffice to attain the optimum in the perfect information case. Luttmer and Zeckhauser show, however, that in the special two-type case, offering just a single schedule would suffice to attain the optimum. Our model differs in that individuals are perfectly informed about their type right from the outset. We show that offering two schedules would be optimal. While this might seem to be inconsistent at a first blush, it should be noted, that our model could be re-formulated as suggesting only a single schedule. 10 This specification assumes that the interest rate is zero and that the government has no revenue needs.
Properties of the Pareto-Efficient UI Programs
An interesting preliminary question is whether a Pareto-efficient UI program must offer two distinct schedules (a separating equilibrium) or just a single schedule (a pooling equilibrium). Our first result establishes that a Pareto-efficient UI program necessarily involves a separating equilibrium. Formally, Lemma: A Pareto-efficient UI program must have a separating equilibrium.
Proof: See Appendix A. ■ Now, we turn to our main point: under some conditions a Pareto-efficient UI program which favors the low-ability individual must offer this individual a schedule with rising benefits over time; whereas the high-ability individual is still offered a schedule with declining benefits over time. 11 More specifically, two conditions are required. First, the social welfare weight (α ) assigned to the high search-ability individual (type 2) is small. Second, the search disincentive effect on the low searchability individual (type 1) caused by the UI system is rather small. Formally, we measure this disincentive effect by the term ) ( The rationale for this result is as follows. In general, bearing on the optimal tax literature, one would like to reduce the distortion as much as possible for the highability individual [see Sadka (1976) ]. In the UI context, reducing the distortion amounts to mitigating the moral hazard problem. As the UI literature suggests, this can be achieved by offering a schedule with declining benefits over time for the highability individual. A declining schedule for the low-ability individual would also serve the purpose of mitigating the moral hazard problem. However, for the low-ability individual there is also another consideration. Allowing benefits to rise over time enables the government to mitigate the binding incentive constraint of the high-ability type (discouraging her from choosing the schedule designed for the low-ability individual). The reason for this derives from the fact that the marginal rate of substitution between the benefit levels in the two periods is higher for the high-ability individual, as she is less likely to remain unemployed in the second period, conditional on being unemployed in the first period. By mitigating this constraint, the government can raise the utility of the low-ability individual at the expense of the high-ability individual, which is desirable when α is sufficiently small. Thus, when the distortion caused by a rising schedule is small enough, the "re-distribution" motive dominates, and it is Pareto-efficient to offer the low-ability individual a schedule with rising benefits over time. This idea of searching for additional policy tools aimed at mitigating incentive compatibility constraints in order to enhance welfare lies at the core of the second-best policy design literature that followed the seminal works of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) and Mirrlees (1971) . For instance, Diamond and Mirrlees (1978) show that taxing the returns to saving can mitigate the incentive compatibility constraint, thereby improving the disability insurance system.
Conclusions
The primary goal of UI programs is to provide a tool for consumption smoothing over periods of employment and unemployment. A key result in the literature suggests that so as to mitigate the inherent moral hazard effects inherent to such programs, due to the asymmetry in information, benefits should decline over time. Indeed, UI programs in most industrial countries follow this pattern.
In this paper, we re-examine this key result in the context of heterogeneous individuals. We suggest that Pareto-efficient UI programs generally offer a variety of benefit-contribution schedules (separating equilibria). More importantly, Paretoefficient UI programs which favor the low search-ability workers may offer them schedules with rising benefits over time.
Proof of the Lemma
We first turn to establish a simple claim which will be used in the proof. For this purpose we introduce a new piece of notation: we denote by her second period of unemployment on her probability to find a job, evaluated at the individual optimal choice.
Claim:
). ( ) ( 2 2 2 1 b b Δ ≥ Δ
Proof of the Claim: The first order condition for the type-i individual optimization
(with respect to search effort in the second period) implies:
Fully differentiating the expression in (A1) with respect to i e 2 , employing (A1) and rearranging yields: 
We turn next to prove the lemma. The proof will be by way of contradiction. Let the optimal solution be a pooling equilibrium. Denote the optimal schedule by ) , , ( .
Differentiating the indirect utility in (1) with respect to 1 b and 2 b , employing the envelope theorem, implies that the marginal rate of substitution between the two benefit levels (fixing the payroll tax, τ ) is given by: . That is we offer a second schedule which lies on the indifference curve of the high-ability type going through the original schedule by moving (slightly) along her indifference curve in the southeast direction (see Figure 1 in the Appendix B). By construction, the high-ability individual (type 2) will be indifferent between the two schedules, whereas the low-ability individual (type 1) will strictly prefer the original (presumably optimal) schedule to the new schedule, as her indifference curve is flatter than that of the high-ability type. Thus, the incentive constraints are still satisfied. Moreover, as we decrease the benefit to which the high-ability individual is entitled during the second period, she will increase her search effort (and hence her chances to find a job) during this period. By construction of the new schedule, the effort exerted during the first period remains the same. Differentiating the revenue constraint in (3), denoting by ) , ( 2 1 ε ε Ω the total effect of introducing the new schedule on the net tax revenues, it follows that: A necessary condition for the original schedule to be Pareto-efficient is that
. Otherwise, offering the new schedule will maintain the incentive constraints, attain the same level of utility (for both types) as in the original schedules, but result in a positive fiscal surplus. This surplus can be utilized to attain a Pareto improvement, by raising the level of utility at all states for both types by the same arbitrarily small amount, which does not change the search and the mimicking incentives. This necessary condition implies in particular that: . This time the new schedule lies on the indifference curve of the low-ability type going through the original schedule, by moving along her curve in the north-west direction (see Figure 2 in Appendix B). By construction, the low-ability individual (type 1) will be indifferent between the two schedules, whereas the highability individual (type 2) will strictly prefer the original (presumably optimal) schedule to the new one, as her indifference curve is steeper than that of the lowability type. Thus, the two incentive constraints are satisfied. Moreover, as we increase the benefit to which the low-ability individual is entitled during the second period, she will decrease her search effort (and hence her chances to find a job) during this period. By construction of the new schedule, the effort exerted during the first period remains the same. Differentiating the revenue constraint in (3), denoting by ) , ( 2 1 ε ε Ψ the total effect of introducing the new schedule on the net tax revenues, it follows that: . Otherwise, offering the new schedule will maintain the incentive constraints, attain both types the same level of utility as in the original schedules, but result in a positive fiscal surplus, which can attain a Pareto improvement. This necessary condition implies in particular that:
Comparing the two necessary conditions (A4) and (A6) yields a contradiction, noting that by the claim ) ( ) (
< , by virtue of the properties of the probability function; and,
, by virtue of condition (A4). This completes the proof. ■
Proof of the Proposition
We first prove that 
[ ] . It suffices to show that such a modification of the presumably efficient schedules results in a fiscal surplus (in expected terms) for the high-ability individual as well, to obtain the desired contradiction. The aggregate surplus (from both types) may be utilized to attain a Pareto improvement (thereby raising the utility of the lowability individual).
to show that her search effort (hence employment chances) is higher (in each period) than that of the low-ability type, when faced with the same schedule. The reason being that in such a case, the expected net surplus for the high-ability type would exceed that obtained for the low-ability type (which is by presumption strictly positive We turn next to the first period. Re-formulating the indirect utility given in (1), yields: Fully differentiating the first-order condition in (A11) with respect to a, yields:
[ ] 
